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RichLP -> RE: Iraq Leadership Wants Timetable For US Troop Departure (7/21/2008 12:36:35 AM)
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quote:
ORIGINAL: backrowbaptist quote:
ORIGINAL: RichLP One quick question. do you think Bush acted irresponsibly by saying "bring them on?" I don't. The strategy has always been to draw the terrorists into battle in Iraq and Afganistan, where our troops can fight them, instead of waiting for them to attack us again and respond. It's worked. We've been kept safe for seven years because of it. This is wrong for the simple fact that the vast majority of the insurgents in Iraq who targeted our troops were not Al-Qaeda-type terrorists, but rather disgruntled one-time Iraqi soldiers (from the Iraqi army of the Hussein era) who were stripped of their livelihood by L. Paul Bremer III's executive order disbanding the Iraqi army, Republican Guard, Special Republican Guard, and other military/security elements of the Hussein regime. I have talked about this extensively in the Iraq war thread and will pull up older posts of mine containing supporting evidence, but in a nutshell, they were disgruntled for the following reasons. During the short war between the US-led coalition and the Baath military, US propaganda leaflets exhorted the Iraqi army not to fight for Saddam. Those leaflets said that US, once in charge of reconstruction, would have needed manpower and that the Iraqi army, after the war, would have been an integral part of that rebuilding effort through the provision of that very manpower. Many Iraqi soldiers and officers accepted that offer and did not fight. In fact, after ORHA/CPA's on-the-ground officers, including US military officers were in place, liaison meetings between ORHA/CPA and Iraqi military generals took place. The latter promised ORHA/CPA that in a matter of days, military police and thousands of men would have been available to serve as security and as laborers. Security was direly needed as looting was ravaging Baghdad, as US troops were ordered not to intervene in the looting, and as there were not enough troops to safeguard all of Baghdad and other major areas. It would have been logical and pragmatic to utilize those Iraqi troops and police. They were locals, they had weapons, they knew the language, culture, streets, intersections, weapons depots. And by employing them, paying them, rewarding them... we could have won their trust and allegiance. They would have seen that we were men who kept our word; they would have seen we could be trusted; they would have felt accomplished and proud as they were part of the new Iraq's rebuilding effort; and, very importantly, they would have received wages to support their families and to feed themselves. This last point was extremely important as honor and pride are very important in the Arab world, and a man's ability to provide and to earn for themselves and their families are a paramount priority. But when the order from Washington came to Bremer, and then the Independent Military Gathering (as the Iraqi officers and soldiers who were hoping to get what the leaflets promised) was left out in the cold, to the shock and unbelief of the now angry ORHA/CPA American officers, the Iraqi soldiers and their officers were now embittered. And they turned their weapons - which they knew how to use thanks to military training - on OUR SOLDIERS. They were NOT terrorists like the Salafi Sunnis like the Al-Qaeda of Osama Bin Laden. Granted, some homegrown insurgents later turned to radical Islam or were already Shiite Muslims who were very religious. But they were not terrorists like Osama; they were primarily angry for what they saw as an American betrayal. They didn't care about striking US soil; they wanted to exact revenge on the Americans and they now wanted to expel what they saw (not incorrectly) as a FOREIGN OCCUPATION ARMY. The idea that those ragtag combatants will one day explode nukes in smalltown America is absolutely ludicrous - and it is a fantastic example of how fearmongering has been a pivotal (and sadly, oftentimes successful) tactic of the Bush Administration.
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